Entire Agreement Clauses: Convergence between US and Danish Contract Law? by Mitkidis, Katerina & Neumann, Thomas
 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entire Agreement Clauses:  
Convergence between US and Danish 
Contract Law? 
 
Katerina Mitkidis*  & Thomas Neumann**
                                                            
* PhD, Master of Laws. Assistant professor, INTRAlaw center, Department of 
Law, Aarhus University, e-mail: katpe@law.au.dk. orcid.org/0000-0002-2775-
0843  
** PhD, Master of Laws. Associate Professor Department of Law, Aalborg 
University, e-mail: thn@law.aau.dk. Founder and editor of the CISGNordic.net 
research database. orcid.org/0000-0002-0477-7429. 
NJCL 2017/2 
 
181 
1.	 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 182	
2.	 COMMERCIAL CONTRACT DRAFTING ............................................. 186	
3.	 EA CLAUSES UNDER AMERICAN LAW ............................................ 191	
3.1.	 EA CLAUSES AND DETERMINING THE CONTRACTUAL 
CONTENT .................................................................................. 191	
3.2.	 EA CLAUSES AND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION ............... 194	
3.3.	 SUMMARY ON US LAW ............................................................ 195	
4.	 EA CLAUSES UNDER DANISH LAW ................................................. 195	
4.1.	 BACKGROUND COMMENTS ON THE DANISH LEGAL SYSTEM
 195	
4.2.	 THE INSEPARABLE ISSUES OF CONTRACTUAL CONTENT AND 
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION ............................................... 198	
4.3.	 PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE JUDICIARY ................................. 199	
4.4.	 POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF EA CLAUSES GOVERNED BY 
DANISH LAW ............................................................................ 201	
4.5.	 FINAL REMARKS ON THE TREATMENT OF EA CLAUSES 
UNDER DANISH LAW ............................................................... 204	
5.	 DISCUSSION – LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, CONVERGENCE, 
TRANSNATIONALIZATION OR? ......................................................... 205	
6.	 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 207	
  
EA CLAUSES: US AND DANISH LAW? 182 
ABSTRACT 
The majority of worldwide concluded commercial contracts are 
nowadays written in English and based on Anglo-American contract 
models. This happens regardless of the governing law of the specific 
contract. When relying on those models, contractual parties often embrace 
not only the actual wording, but also the contract drafting style typical for 
common law countries. In this way, common law concepts and rules can 
be transferred to civil law jurisdictions, however, without certainty about 
the legal effects. This is especially pertinent to boilerplate provisions. 
On this background, the article aims to elucidate the influence of 
American contract law and contract drafting style on Danish contract law 
and practice, taking the entire agreement (EA) clause as an example. While 
applying comparative law method, and more specifically taking the 
departure in various theories on diffusion of law, it aims to investigate the 
treatment of EA clauses in contracts governed by Danish law and opens 
up a discussion whether on the example of EA clauses we can observe 
Americanization of Danish contract law or whether we should rather 
speak of legal transplants or convergence between American and Danish 
contract law. 
The findings suggest that the use of EA clauses in contracts 
governed by Danish law can indeed be deemed legal transplants, but that 
it is impossible to identify whether this transplanting process has been 
successful. For now, the available court decisions from the two 
jurisdictions dealing with the topic of EA clauses do not show mutual 
appreciation between the two legal systems, although the results are not 
as divergent as expected. Therefore, what we are experiencing seems to be 
convergence or transnationalization of contractual practice rather than 
contract law. We might thus conclude that the contract drafting process 
overtakes the judiciary, which is more attached to national rules and 
values. This does not seem to be the case for Denmark only, but appears 
to be a common observation in other civil law jurisdictions as well. In line 
with the irritant perspective on the legal transplants theory, it can then be 
expected that the contract drafting practice will in turn influence national 
legal rules and the courts’ approach. This effect can already be seen in 
Danish legal scholarship and its presumption that the judges will not 
entirely disregard EA clauses, but take a middle road in interpreting them. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
English is a lingua franca of international business.1 Moreover, the 
majority of nowadays concluded commercial contracts are not only 
                                                            
1 C Nickerson, ‘English as a Lingua Franca in International Business Context’ (2005) 24 
English for Special Purposes 367; D Echenberg, ‘Negotiating International Contracts: Does 
the Process Invite a Review of Standard Contracts from the Point of View of National 
Legal Requirements?’ in G Cordero-Moss (ed), Boilerplate Clauses, International Commercial 
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written in English but also based on Anglo-American contract models.2 
While both England and the USA can be defined as sources of the 
commonly used contract models, due to the size of national economies, it 
is mostly American law and contracting that finds its way to other 
countries. This development has been described in legal scholarship as the 
‘reception of American law’3 or even the ‘Americanization’4 of law.  
The present article is one of the outcomes of a research project 
aiming to elucidate the influence of common law on civil law in the area 
of contract law and contract drafting practice. It takes the influence of 
American contract law and contract drafting style on Danish contract law 
and practice as an example.5 The purpose of the clauses is described in 
detail in sections III and IV. However, briefly it can be said that EA clauses 
aim to confine the full agreement between the contractual parties into the 
contractual text; they intend to exclude any extrinsic communication, 
agreements and evidence from determining the contract’s content and, 
depending on jurisdiction, contract interpretation. 
The EA clauses are typical examples of boilerplate provisions 
characteristic of common law contract models.6 The use of common law-
inspired boilerplate provisions has proliferated globally through 
commercial contracting, in both common and civil law countries. In order 
to ascertain the use of EA clauses in Danish contracts, the authors have 
conducted interviews with representatives of Danish companies and legal 
practice. The investigation confirmed that indeed EA clauses are present 
in an absolute majority of international contracts regardless of the 
                                                            
Contracts and the Applicable Law (Cambridge University Press 2011), 16 (hereinafter 
Cordero-Moss ed., Boilerplate Clauses). 
2 G Cordero-Moss, ‘International Contracts Between Common Law and Civil Law: Is 
Non-State Law to Be Preferred? the Difficulty of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as 
Good Faith’ (2007) 7(1) Global Jurist 1, 1. 
3 W Wiegand, ‘The Reception of American Law in Europe’ (1991) 39 AJCL 229. 
4 M Shapiro, ‘The Globalization of Law’ (1993) 1 Ind.J.Global Legal Studies 37, 39; FW 
Grosheide, ‘Legal Borrowing and Drafting International Commercial Contracts’ in K 
Boele-Woelki et al. (eds), Comparability and Evaluation: Essays on Comparative Law, Private 
International Law, and International Commercial Arbitration, in Honour of Dimitra Kokkini-
Iatridou (M. Nijhoff Publishers 1994), 74-75. 
5 See also Katerina Mitkidis, The use of entire agreement clauses in contracts governed by Danish 
law, 2017/3 Erhversjuridisk tidskrift 198 (reporting empirical observations gained 
through an interviews-based study on the use of EA clauses in contracts governed by 
Danish law). 
6 A Müller, Protecting the Integrity of a Written Agreement: A Comparative Analysis of the Parol 
Evidence Rule, Merger Clauses and No Oral Modification Clauses in U.S., English, German and 
Swiss Law and International Instruments (CISG, PICC, PECL, DCFR and CESL) (Eleven 
International Publishing 2013), 177-178; R Strugała, ‘Merger Clauses in Contracts 
Governed by Polish Law’ (2013) 3 Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration and Economics 14, 
15. 
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governing law, and sometimes also in domestic contracts.7 This wide-
spread use of common law-originated boilerplate provisions, and namely 
EA clauses, calls for more investigation into this phenomenon, especially 
due to their hesitant and somewhat unclear acceptance by civil law 
judiciary.8  
Thus, while applying comparative law method and taking the 
departure in theories of diffusion of law9 (including the legal transplant 
theory),10 this article aims to investigate the treatment of EA clauses in 
contracts governed by Danish law and open up the discussion whether on 
the example of EA clauses we can indeed observe Americanization of 
Danish contract law or whether we should rather speak of legal transplants 
or convergence between American and Danish contract law. Possibly, the 
answer is neither of the above, but a development of transnational 
contract law and practice that is increasingly disconnected from national 
legal systems. The article has both theoretical and practical relevance; it 
contributes to the legal scholarship on transnationalization tendencies in 
private law as well as provides Danish companies with a better 
understanding of the background and original purpose of EA clauses and 
the treatment of these clauses under Danish jurisdiction, therefore 
allowing them to better manage the connected business and legal risks. 
The question at hand will be approached through the following 
steps: (i) reviewing currently predominant contract drafting style and the 
reasons behind it, (ii) identifying the original function of EA clauses under 
American law and assessing whether this function is fulfilled under 
American law, (iii) assessing whether the original function is achieved 
when EA clauses are included in contracts governed by Danish law, and 
(iv) discussing whether on the example of the use of EA clauses in Danish 
contracts we can observe Americanization of Danish law, convergence 
between the two legal systems or development of a transnational 
contracting practice disconnected from national laws. 
The article presents a micro-comparison of EA clauses in two 
jurisdictions, namely the USA and Denmark. The selection of the USA for 
the comparison is straightforward as explained in the introduction part 
above. Denmark is then chosen for several reasons. Firstly, Denmark, 
although home to a number of large multinational companies, is a smaller 
                                                            
7 The collected data (anonymized) are on file with the corresponding author and reported 
in Mitkidis (n 5); for data from another civil law jurisdiction, see e.g. D Beenders and J-
W Meijer, ‘Uitleg van commerciële contracten in de praktijk’ (2013) 9 AA 646 (reporting 
that over a half of Dutch contracts, including those between domestic parties, include an 
EA clause). 
8 For Danish case law, see below section V. For a prominent civil law case on this issue, 
see the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court HR 5 April 2013, NJ 2013, 214 (establishing 
the exact opposite effect of an EA clause than its original one). 
9 W Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: a Global Perspective’ (2004) 49 J Legal Plur 1, 5. 
10 A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, University of 
Georgia Press 1993). 
NJCL 2017/2 
 
185 
country with strong economic ties to the USA,11 and thus presumably 
exposed to the influence of the US contracting practice. Secondly, 
Denmark is part of Scandinavia, which is a legal region known for its 
pragmatic court approach. The effects of EA clauses that American 
owners and business partners of Danish corporations expect may not 
materialize here. Finally, the article aims to contribute new knowledge to 
legal scholarship, as there is currently no comprehensive literature on this 
issue in regard to Denmark.12 
The starting point of this article is an investigation into a legal 
institution originating in one jurisdiction and comparing its effects while 
being repeatedly used in another jurisdiction. The point of departure is 
thus the idea of borrowings, or in other words, diffusion of laws and legal 
institutions among jurisdictions.13 Traditionally, legal transplants 
scholarship has been concerned with moving of an entire legal system or 
a portion of it (meaning a legal rule in the form of a statute) to a new 
location, through copying or imposing laws in order to establish a legal 
system where there was not such one, in order to fill in existing gaps in 
the recipient’s legal system or to replace it entirely.14 This narrow 
understanding of legal transplants has been broadened and many variants 
have been identified, this leading to speaking rather of diffusion of law as 
a broader term than legal transplants.15 Diffusion of law through 
commercial contracts are one of the variants.1617 
                                                            
11 The USA is Denmark’s main non-European trading partner, see 
http://www.worldstopexports.com/denmarks-top-import-partners/. 
12 Within Danish jurisdiction, one master thesis studying EA clauses from the law and 
economics perspective has been found, see AL Carstensen and JK Christensen, 
Fuldstændighedsklausuler i B2B kontrakter (Merger clauses in B2B contracts) (supervised by P 
Møgelvang-Hansen and O Lando, 2009). For studies on EA clauses from other 
jurisdictions, see Strugała (n 6); Müller (n 6); HW Bjørnstad, Entire Agreement-klausuler 
(Skriftserie 177, Institutt for privatrett, University of Oslo 2009); M Fontaine and F De 
Ly, Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
2009), 129-150; L Gorton, ‘Merger Clauses in Business Contracts’ (2008) Erhvervsjuridisk 
Tidsskrift 344; D van Dorst, The Entire Agreement Clause, (Msc thesis supervised by MW 
Hesselink, 2015); O Kirman, (re)Defining the Entire Agreement Clause, (Msc thesis supervised 
by V Mak and G van Dijk, 2015/16). 
13 ‘History of a system of law is largely a history of borrowings of legal materials from 
other legal systems and of assimilation of materials from outside of the law.’ See Watson 
(n 10), 22 (citing Roscoe Pound). Twining (n 9); M Graziadei, ‘Comparative Law as the 
Study of Transplants and Receptions’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 2006). 
14 Watson (n 10). 
15 Twining (n 9), 17; A Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (2000) 4.4 
EJCL, http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html. 
16 See e.g. L-W Lin, ‘Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor 
Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example’ (2009) 57(3) AJCL 711. 
17 NB, we use the term diffusion of law in line with Twining (n 9). For the purpose of 
this article, this term encompasses among others also the term of legal transplant. 
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Contractual freedom allows parties to include in their contract 
provisions originating from another legal system than the governing law 
of the contract, or the domestic law of the parties for that matter. Such 
foreign provisions and legal constructs can then be seen as a type of a legal 
transplant,18 and EA clauses are a frequently seen example of the same in 
Danish contract practice. 
2. COMMERCIAL CONTRACT DRAFTING 
Major legal transplants (most often) happen as a conscious process; 
the exporter wants to impose her legal rules and institutions upon the 
importer or the importer wants to copy the rules of the exporter. 
However, the diffusion of EA clauses from American to Danish law 
happen mostly unintentionally as a result of day-to-day contract drafting 
and negotiation practice rather than fulfilling specific legal needs.19 
Today, when a lawyer starts drafting a new contract, (s)he will rarely 
start from scratch. In order to save time and money,20 lawyers will usually 
reach for a similar, previously written contract, the company’s standard 
terms and conditions or a pre-printed contract form (contract models).21 
The existence of such models is moreover of great importance when a 
contract is negotiated by a businessperson without the involvement of a 
lawyer.22 Rarely the contract model is used in full, but the final contract is 
a mix of provisions coming from different sources and different 
jurisdictions that do not necessarily respect the legal system and culture of 
the governing law of the contract.23 In fact, it is not uncommon that the 
governing law is chosen only after the contract is negotiated.24 Thus, in an 
                                                            
18 Due to its closer ties to economic interests rather than national legal culture and 
sentiments, contract law and commercial law are considered easier transferable than for 
example public or constitutional law. See O Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of 
Comparative Law’ (1974) 37(1) MLR 1, 12-13; Twining (n 9), 29; and R Cotterrell, ‘Is 
There a Logic of Legal Transplants?’ in D Nelken and J Feest, Adapting Legal Cultures 
(Hart Publishing 2001), 82. 
19 Not all uses of EA clauses are however unintended. Companies may want to include 
the clauses into their contracts to fulfil the functions originally assigned to them by 
common law or other strategic functions, such as ascertaining a strong negotiation 
position if a dispute arises (see Cordero-Moss ed., Boilerplate Clauses (n 1), 4) or simply 
influencing the behaviour of the parties (see Echenberg (n 1), 5). 
20 MC Vettese, ‘Multinational Companies and National Contracts’ in Cordero-Moss ed., 
Boilerplate Clauses (n 1), 20-21. 
21 LA DiMatteo, International contracting: law and practice (Kluwer Law International 2013), 
37. 
22 Vettese (n 20), 22; DiMatteo (n 21), 38. 
23 G Cordero-Moss, Anglo-American Contract Models and Norwegian or other Civilian Governing 
Law: Introduction and Method (Skriftserie 169, Institutt for privatrett, University of Oslo 
2007), 8. 
24 F Bortolotti, Drafting and negotiating international commercial contracts: a practical guide 
(International Chamber of Commerce 2013), 100. 
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extreme situation, some of the provisions originating from foreign law or 
contract models may not only be incompatible, but directly a breach of 
the governing law of the contract or the laws of the country where the 
contract is performed.25 In order to avoid such negative effects, 
companies using common law-inspired contract models in contracts 
governed by a civil law system should systematically compare each 
provision of the contract model and each legal concept with the governing 
law of the contract to make sure that the content is consistent with it. 
However, such exercise is extremely time consuming and thus costly and 
would mean that the use of contract models does not reduce but escalate 
negotiation costs.26 That is why companies often accept the original 
wording of a contract model without critically assessing it against the 
governing law and treat it as an acceptable legal risk. 
Often, they are lucky; the inconsistency between the origins of 
contract models and the governing law usually does not cause troubles 
during the contract performance.27 It may, however, bring uncertainties 
to the contractual parties when a dispute arises as to what effects these 
provisions will have under the governing law. Civil law judges and arbiters 
will have to ask the questions whether to respect the parties contractual 
text and approach it as a correction of the governing law or whether the 
principles underlying the governing law should prevail over the expressed 
words of the contractual parties.28 
One of the major consequences of the use of common law-inspired 
contract models is the trend towards drafting self-sufficient contracts.29 In 
the words of Corderro-Moss, self-sufficient contracts mean contracts that 
are ‘uniformly interpreted on the basis of its own terms.’30 Logically, they are long 
and as exhaustive as possible. 
Drafting such contracts is counter-intuitive in civil law countries. 
Traditionally, commercial contracts originating in civil law countries are 
concise and address only major aspects of the specific deal.31 There are a 
couple of reasons for this. Firstly, the contractual parties in civil law 
                                                            
25 S Hecker et al., ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Anti-Corruption Compliance and 
Antitrust Law in Russia’ (Debevoise&Plimpton, FCPA Update: A Global Anti-
Corruption Newsletter, 2015-03), 
http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2015/03/fcpa_upda
te_march_2015.pdf. 
26 ET Canuel, ‘Comparative Commercial Law: Methodologies, Black Letter Law and 
Law-in-Action’ (2012) Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 1, 24. 
27 In the Danish context, this can be proved by the small number of court decisions on 
the use of EA clauses in contracts governed by Danish law. 
28 Cordero-Moss (n 2), 19-21. 
29 G Cordero-Moss, ‘Conclusion: The self-sufficient contract, uniformly interpreted on 
the basis of its own terms: an illusion, but not fully useless’ in Cordero-Moss ed., 
Boilerplate Clauses (n 1). 
30 Ibid 
31 R Nielsen, Contract Law in Denmark (DJØF Publishing 2011), 90. 
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jurisdictions can rely on the definitions, regulation and principles codified 
in the governing law of the contract.32 Thus, there is no point in drafting 
lengthy contracts just to repeat what is stated in the background law or to 
run the risk that such formulation could be overturned by an adjudicator 
applying the underlying principles of the governing law, such as the 
principles of fairness and reasonableness. Concise contracts are thus an 
expression of transaction efficiency.33 Secondly, contract law in civil law 
countries, including Denmark, is based on the principle of 
consensualism.34 According to this principle, a contract is born when the 
parties agree on the principal matters of the object of the contract. This is 
reinforced by the subjective theory of interpretation in determining 
contracts’ content typical for civil law countries, when the subjective intent 
of the parties is the starting point.35  
In contrast, contracts originating in common law countries are 
traditionally lengthy and detailed.36 They are based on the principle of 
predictability.37 A major aspect of predictability is that contractual parties 
are able to forecast an outcome if a dispute arises from their contract. 
While in civil law countries predictability is supported by codification of 
law, in common law countries it is secured by the parol evidence rule. 
Within the US context,38 the parol evidence rule in essence means that 
when an adjudicator construes a contract, he will be bound by the actual 
contractual text and will not be able to use extrinsic evidence presented by 
the parties, which contradicts or alters the writing, if the parties intended 
the contract to integrate all their prior or contemporaneous agreements.39 
The background idea is that commercial parties are able to understand and 
                                                            
32 Vettese (n 20), 24. 
33 Tomas Lindholm in MB Andersen and J Christoffersen (eds), Forhandlingene ved Det 38. 
Nordiske Juristmøde i København, 21.-23. august 2008, volume 2, (2008), available at 
http://nordiskjurist.org/meetings/fremmede-retsbegreber-i-nordisk-kontraktsret/, 616. 
34 Nielsen (n 31), 76. 
35 There is no clear subjective or objective theory of interpretation, but shades and 
mixtures of both. However, civil law countries take most often subjective theory as their 
starting point in contract interpretation, while common law countries start from the 
objective theory. See JM Perillo, ‘The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract 
Formation and Interpretation’ (2000) 69 Fordham L.Rev. 427; Fontaine and De Ly (n 12), 
106-114. 
36 Vettese, (n 20), 23. 
37 Cordero-Moss (n 2), 1; Lindholm (n 33), 616. 
38 While shared by all common law countries, the rule has developed slightly differently 
in various common law jurisdictions. For a general overview, see Fontaine and De Ly (n 
12), 114ff. 
39 RA Lord, Williston on Contracts (4th edn, Thomson Reuters 1990), para 33.1 (hereinafter 
Williston on Contracts); AL Corbin, JM Perillo and JE Murray, Corbin on Contracts (Lexis 
Nexis, Matthew Bender 2015; Release No. 15S2), chapter 5 (hereinafter Corbin on 
Contracts); UCC § 2-202 (amended 2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 
(1981). 
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evaluate business opportunities and risks and enter into agreements based 
on this understanding.40 As a consequence, they should be able to rely on 
what they have agreed to in writing and judicial intervention into the deal 
should be limited. That is why business actors in common law countries 
aim to cover as many details as possible in the contractual text and to make 
the contract complete and integrated ‘on its face’, so that there is only a 
little room for determining the content of the contract based on other 
circumstances and documents. EA clauses are typical means to express the 
parties’ intention to conclude a completely integrated contract and to 
reinforce the parol evidence rules.41 The substantive parol evidence 
contract is then accompanied by objective style of contract interpretation 
that is based on the principle of formalism.42 When interpreting a contract, 
US adjudicators are not restricted to move within the four corners of a 
contract, but in case of a conflict between the wording of a contract and 
any extrinsic evidence, the express terms of the contract will prevail.43 
The spread of the common law-inspired contract models brought 
not only the actual wording of contractual provisions, but naturally also 
the drafting style as such.44 The unification of international contract 
drafting style, as we will show below on the example of EA clauses, 
obscures the presumed sharp distinctions between civil and common 
contract law and may even influence the legal interpretation of contracts.  
The trend of self-sufficient contracts, however, goes beyond the use 
of common law-originated contract models. It has also been tied with the 
effort to disconnect a contract from its governing law as much as possible, 
to create ‘a barrier from the real world.’45 This comes from the fact that 
when a contract’s governing law is different from the one of a contracting 
party, this party will most often not have as detailed knowledge of the 
governing legal system as needed to understand the system’s consequences 
for the contract and the business. It is thus safer for the contracting party 
to secure that the contract itself will be self-sufficient and that the 
influence of the governing law will be minimal.46 
Although various tools have been developed in contract practice to 
secure the contract’s self-sufficiency, the idea that a contract may be 
entirely self-sufficient and completely disconnected from the governing 
law is rather illusory. First of all, the contractual parties cannot naturally 
                                                            
40 Similarly, in regard to English law, see Cordero-Moss (n 2), 4-5. 
41 See below section IV.A. 
42 ML Movsesian, ‘Formalism in American Contract Law: Classical and Contemporary’ 
(2012) 12 Ius Gentium 115; LA DiMatteo, ‘False dichotomies in commercial contract 
interpretation’ (2012) 11 Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 27. 
43 UCC § 1-303 (e) (amended 2001). 
44 D Plechinger, ‘Der skal være en udløbsdato på sådan en post’ (based on an interview 
with Søren Jenstrup), Advokaten 4/2015, 21-22. 
45 Vettese (n 20), 26. 
46 Corderro-Moss classifies EA clauses as clauses ‘aiming at fully detaching the contract 
from the applicable law’, see Cordero-Moss ed., Boilerplate Clauses (n 1), 353-358.  
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foresee all possible events and thus no contract can be fully complete. 
Nevertheless, detailed wording lowers the possibility of contract 
interpretation using extrinsic evidence.47 Secondly, the governing law may 
contain some mandatory provisions that the contractual parties cannot 
ignore. And finally, the governing law’s rules on interpretation will affect 
the extent to which the contract can be considered the whole agreement 
between the parties. 
Still, EA clauses are a major means aiming to establish self-
sufficiency of a contract and detaching a contract from its governing law. 
Their main function is to exclude all or specifically named extrinsic 
evidence, such as prior agreements, precontractual documents and 
communication, and sometimes even general conditions and trade usage 
from the contract for the purpose of its interpretation.48 EA clauses seem 
to contain both substantive and evidentiary elements to it; though this 
view differs across jurisdictions. In the USA, the parol evidence rule and 
thus also EA clauses are considered a substantive contract law issue.49 In 
civil law countries, EA clauses have a stronger evidentiary connotation.50 
A common EA clause may read as follows: ‘[t]his Agreement constitutes 
the entire Agreement between the parties pertaining to the subject matter contained 
herein, and supersedes all prior agreements, representations and understandings of the 
parties.’51 The general motivation for inclusion of an EA clause into a 
contract is to achieve certainty as to the scope of the understanding 
between the contractual parties, especially for the purpose of its 
interpretation by courts if a dispute arises.52 However, as a typical 
boilerplate provision, an EA clause is often not given much thought 
during negotiations. After lengthy negotiations, the parties may truly 
believe that the contract is the complete understanding between them and 
that the EA clause merely restates this.53 However, as we will see below, 
they may be mistaken.  
                                                            
47 EA Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (3rd edn, Aspen Publishers 2004), para 7.1, 219 
(hereinafter Farnsworth on Contracts), para 7.3, 232; Bortolotti (n 24), 100-101. 
48 Fontaine and De Ly (n 12), 131. 
49 Williston on Contracts (n 39), para 33.1 (Stating that there is a general agreement in 
scholarship and case law that the parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law of 
contracts.); and similarly Farnsworth on Contracts (n 47), para 7.2, 222. 
50 Gorton (n 12), 2; see also CISG-AC Opinion no 3, ‘Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning 
Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG’, 23 October 2004, rapporteur: Professor 
Richard Hyland, Rutgers Law School, Camden, NJ, USA. 
51 Example taken from Corbin on Contracts (n 39), para 25.8. 
52 Gorton (n 12), 1. 
53 TL Stark, Negotiating and Drafting Contract Boilerplate (Lexis Nexis, Law Journal Press 
2003), para 18.01. 
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3. EA CLAUSES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 
Before looking into the treatment of EA clauses by Danish law, we 
have to establish what the original purpose of these clauses is under 
American law and to what extent it is achieved in practice. 
It may be a simplification to address American contract law as one 
set of legal rules since American contract law is essentially common law, 
which can develop differently among various states. Still, American 
contract law is more consistent among the states than one would expect. 
Firstly, common law of contracts in various states share basic principles. 
These can be found in the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts, 
a treatise with a strong authoritative power that is frequently cited in 
American court decisions and jurisprudence. Secondly, the Uniform 
Commercial Code has been adopted with the purpose of harmonizing 
major parts of commercial law across the country. Finally, other aspects, 
such as one language and legal education, contribute to the integrated 
American legal culture.54 It is this common core of American contract law 
that is considered in this article. 
3.1. EA CLAUSES AND DETERMINING THE CONTRACTUAL CONTENT 
In the USA, the use of EA clauses emerged as a reaction to 
uncertainties connected to the application of the parol evidence rule;55 
specifically, as a defence against self-serving testimonies by the parties that 
they agreed on something different from what is covered by the text of 
their contract.56 If an EA clause is found enforceable, it will (most often) 
not only invoke strict application of the parol evidence rule, i.e. prevent 
consideration of any extrinsic evidence contradicting, modifying or 
varying the contractual terms, but also prevent consideration of any 
additional terms when determining the contractual content. 
The parol evidence rule applies when the contractual parties 
intended to conclude a completely integrated contract.57 In order to 
establish whether a contract is completely integrated, the adjudicator 
considers primarily the text of the contract. However, the adjudicator may 
consider extrinsic evidence if it proves that the contract was not intended 
to be completely integrated.58 In order to prove the intention to enter into 
a completely integrated contract, parties started including an EA clause in 
the contractual text. Traditionally, courts have found the presence of an 
EA clause to be conclusive evidence of the parties’ intention to enter into 
                                                            
54 JM Smits, ‘Law Making in the European Union: On Globalization and Contract Law 
in Divergent Legal Cultures’ (2007) 67 La.L.Rev. 1181, 1183. 
55 Wallach speaks about the ‘private parol evidence rule’, see GI Wallach, ‘Declining 
Sanctity of Written Contracts-Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol 
Evidence Rule’ (1979) 44 Mo.L.Rev. 651, 677.  
56 Farnsworth on Contracts (n 47), para 7.3, 233; Fontaine and De Ly (n 12), 118. 
57 UCC § 2-202 (amended 2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 (1981). 
58 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209(3) (1981). 
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a completely integrated contract.5960 However, this strict interpretation 
has since been relaxed. As Wallach wrote ‘[...] the erosion which the parol 
evidence rule has undergone under the Uniform Commercial Code is being paralleled, 
as yet to a significantly lesser degree, by an erosion of the impact of merger clauses.’61 
Restatement Second then pointed out that ‘a writing cannot of itself prove its 
own completeness.’62 This view has been picked up by a large amount of court 
decisions stating that the EA clause is a strong, but only one evidence to 
                                                            
59 Farnsworth on Contracts (n 47), para 7.3, 233; Wallach (n 55), 677; from a vast 
amount of case law, see e.g. ADR North America, L.L.C. v Agway, Inc., 303 F.3d 653 (6th 
Circ. 2002) (‘... a written integration clause is conclusive evidence that the parties intended 
the document to be the final and complete expression of their agreement and that the 
parties intended to supersede any prior contract on the same subject matter ...’); Wayman 
v Amoco Oil Co., 923 F.Supp. 1322 (D. Kansas 1996) (EA clause given effect although not 
read); Smith v Central Soya of Athens, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518 (EDNC 1985) (‘The existence 
of a merger clause generally provides unambiguous and unassailable evidence of the 
parties’ intent with reference to the terms of the contract. It clearly precludes a court 
from admitting extrinsic evidence on a theory that the writing was not a final 
expression.’); Rahemtulla v Hassam, 539 F.Supp.2d 755 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (‘Where a written 
contract contains an integration clause, the law declares the writing to not only be the 
best, but the only evidence of [the parties’] agreement.’); Harbour Town Yacht Club Boat 
Slip Owners’ Ass’n v Safe Berth Management, Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 908 (D.S.C. 2006) (‘... if the 
writing on its face appears to express the whole agreement, parol evidence cannot be 
admitted to add another term thereto. The parol evidence rule is particularly applicable 
where the writing in question has an integration clause.’); An EA clause is applied even 
in a stricter manner where one of the parties is the state, see e.g. Sterling, Winchester & 
Long, L.L.C. v U.S., 83 Fed.Cl. 179 (Fed. Cl. 2008) (‘When a document contains an 
integration clause, no additional terms may be added, whether consistent or inconsistent, 
through parol evidence.’). 
60 This view still prevails in certain jurisdictions, such as N.Y., see A Schwartz and RE 
Scott, ‘Contract Interpretation Redux’ (2010) 119 Y. L. J. 926, 928. 
61 Wallach (n 55), 678. 
62 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210, comment b (1981). 
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be considered in determining parties’ intention in regard to contract’s 
integration.6364 
In relation to this, the question whether the clause was negotiated by 
the parties has gained importance. When EA clauses came to use, 
contractual parties were aware of why they included such a clause into 
their contract. This is, however, not common nowadays when EA clauses 
have to a large extent become standardized and included in commercial 
contracts as a part of boilerplate provisions. This has raised doubts about 
the factual intention of the parties, the understanding and the use of EA 
clauses.65 Nowadays, it is widely accepted that non-negotiated EA clauses 
may be qualified as unconscionable,66 and therefore easier dislodged.67 A 
connected issue is the character of and the power balance between the 
contractual parties. The courts are more willing to give effects to an EA 
                                                            
63 JM Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts (6th edn, St Paul: West 2009), para 3.6 
(hereinafter Calamari and Perillo on Contracts); from vast amount of case law, see e.g. 
Enrico Farms, Inc. v H. J. Heinz Co., 629 F.2d 1304 (9th Circ. 1980) (‘... an integration clause 
in the written agreement is not necessarily conclusive as to the parties’ intent to include 
their entire agreement in the writing.’); Mecklenburg Furniture Shops, Inc. v MAI Systems Corp., 
800 F.Supp. 1328 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (‘... where the instrument contains an integration 
clause, that clause may well be conclusive on the issue of integration. Nonetheless, the 
court must not limit its consideration to the integration clause. Rather, the court should 
consider all the surrounding circumstances, including the prior negotiations of the 
parties, and the terms of the collateral agreement.’); Sicor Ltd. v Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848 
(9th Circ. 1995) (‘... an integration clause in the written contract is but one factor in this 
analysis’); Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v Kenray Associates, Inc., 719 F.3d 635 (7th Circ. 2013) 
(‘Because an integration clause is only some evidence of the parties’ intentions, the court 
should consider an integration clause along with all other relevant evidence on the 
question of integration. As such, the mere inclusion of an integration clause does not 
control the question of whether a writing is or was intended to be a completely integrated 
agreement.’); Budnick Converting, Inc. v Nebula Glass Intern., Inc., 866 F.Supp.2d 976 (S.D. 
Ill. 2012) (‘... a merger or integration clause is strong evidence of the parties’ intent, not 
only to be bound by the agreement, but to have it override conflicting provisions that 
may have been contained in previous or contemporaneous dealings between the parties 
...’); Haywood v University of Pittsburgh, 976 F.Supp.2d 606 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (‘An integration 
clause which states that a writing is meant to represent the parties’ entire agreement is 
also a clear sign that the writing is meant to be just that and thereby expresses all of the 
parties’ negotiations, conversations, and agreements made prior to its execution.’) 
64 This view prevails for example in California, see Schwartz and Scott (n 60), 928. 
65 RJ Mooney, ‘A Friendly Letter to the Oregon Supreme Court: Let’s Try Again on the 
Parol Evidence Rule’ (2005) 84 Or.L.Rev. 369, 387 (‘If, however, as is more generally true, 
one or both parties did not read the clause, did not understand it, or had no realistic 
choice with respect to it, the court should declare it to be unenforceable boilerplate...’). 
66 UCC § 2-302 (amended 2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981). 
See also KL Macintosh, ‘When Are Merger Clauses Unconscionable?’ (1988) 64 
Denv.U.L.Rev. 529; and Seibel v Layne & Bowler, Inc., 56 Or.App. 387 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). 
67 Calamari and Perillo on Contracts (n 63), para 3.6. 
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clause if both parties are experienced commercial subjects with a 
comparable negotiation power.68  
3.2. EA CLAUSES AND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
If given effect, an EA clause will prevent extrinsic evidence in 
determining the content of a contract. However, it will generally not affect 
the use of extrinsic evidence for interpreting ambiguities in the contractual 
text.69 This means that in a dispute decided upon by a US court about a 
contract including an EA clause, the judge should proceed in the following 
way. First he should decide whether the contract is a (fully) integrated one 
taking into consideration the merger clause. If the answer is positive, then 
he moves to the question of what is the content of the contract. In 
answering this question, he will disregard any extrinsic evidence that would 
contradict, modify or add any terms to the actual contractual text. Finally, 
if there are any ambiguities in the contract, he will interpret the meaning 
of such provisions with the aim of respecting the parties’ intention. When 
interpreting the contractual text, he may use all extrinsic evidence. 
However, following the formalist (textual) interpretation, the extrinsic 
evidence must not contradict the contractual text.70 While this process 
seems quite straightforward, it is not as simple to follow in practice as the 
issues of determining the contractual content and its interpretation may 
overlap and may be (and indeed often are) easily confused.71 
In order to avoid confusion and give effect to an EA clause in regard 
to contract interpretation, it is advised that the parties expressly refer to 
what cannot be used when explaining the meaning of a contractual text. 
Such a clause could read as follows:72 
This Agreement constitutes the final agreement between the parties. 
It is the complete and exclusive expression of the parties’ agreement on 
the matters contained in this Agreement. All prior and contemporaneous 
negotiations and agreements between the parties on the matters contained 
                                                            
68 Rumsfeld v Freedom NY, Inc., 329 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (‘Where, as here, the 
parties are both commercial entities or the government, integration clauses are given 
particularly great weight.’). 
69 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 216, comment e (1981) (‘But such a [EA] clause 
does not control ... the interpretation of the written terms.’); see also GB Smith and TJ 
Hall, ‘Merger Clauses and Parol Evidence Rule’ (New York Law Journal, 20 February 
2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202718353003/Merger-Clauses-and-
Parol-Evidence-Rule?slreturn=20170124032213. 
70 UCC § 2-202 (b) (amended 2002). 
71 MN Kniffin, ‘Conflating and Confusing Contract Interpretation and The Parol 
Evidence Rule: Is The Emperor Wearing Someone Else’s Clothes?’ (2009) 62 Rutgers 
L.Rev. 75, 80-81. From scholarship, see example in Fontaine and De Ly, who categorize 
EA clauses as interpretation clauses despite their original purpose (i.e. to invoke the parol 
evidence rule), while discussing their effects both on contract determination and 
interpretation, see Fontaine and De Ly (n 12), chapter 3 (C). 
72 Example borrowed from Stark (n 53), para 18.05. 
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in this Agreement are expressly merged into and superseded by this 
Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement may not be explained, 
supplemented, or qualified through evidence of trade usage or a prior 
course of dealings. 
3.3. SUMMARY ON US LAW 
To summarize, under American law EA clauses are an important – 
though generally rebuttable – evidence of the parties’ intention to 
conclude an integrated contract.73 Thus, it has exclusionary effect in 
determining the content of the contract, but – unless expressly stated – it 
does not affect the interpretation of the meaning of the text. The weight 
assigned to an EA clause is decided on a case-to-case basis74 and depends, 
among other things, on the way the provision is drafted and the types and 
power of the contractual parties. It is thus advised that if contractual 
parties indeed want to secure enforceability of an EA clause in the USA, 
it should be carefully drafted and made as conspicuous as possible, for 
example by using bold letters.75 
4. EA CLAUSES UNDER DANISH LAW 
This part of the article moves to the analysis of the use of EA clauses 
in contracts governed by Danish law. Before entering into analysis of EA 
clauses under Danish law, a basic overview of Danish (contract) law is 
needed. 
4.1. BACKGROUND COMMENTS ON THE DANISH LEGAL SYSTEM 
While Danish law is commonly classified as pertaining to the civil 
law family, it is more correct to classify it as belonging to the Nordic legal 
subfamily as it carries features that distinguishes it from the Germanic and 
Romanic legal systems. 76 For example, the Nordic countries have not 
adopted the structure typical for civil legal systems.77 Neither do they 
operate with big codifications, but with statutes dealing with specific 
                                                            
73 In fact, omission of an EA clause has been taken into consideration by some 
courts when determining completeness of contracts; see e.g. Rajala v Allied Corp., 66 B.R. 
582 (D. Kansas 1986). 
74 Steak n Shake Enterprises, Inc. v Globex Company, 110 F.Supp.3d 1057 (D. Colorado 
2015). 
75 Stark (n 53), para 18.01 and para 18.03. See also Seibel v Layne & Bowler, Inc., 56 Or.App. 
387 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (‘We think that a merger clause which would deny effect to an 
express warranty must be conspicuous to prevent an even greater surprise.’). 
76 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2011), part IV; however, Nordic legal systems are sometimes considered as a 
separate legal family, see e.g. J Lookofsky, ‘Desperately Seeking Subsidiarity: Danish 
Private Law in the Scandinavian, European, and Global Context’ (2009) 161 Duke 
J.Comp.& Int'l L. 161, 170. 
77 Lookofsky (n 76), 170. 
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topics.78 In the contract law area, the Sale of Goods Act (købeloven)79 and 
the Contracts Act (aftaleloven)80 are the most important ones. These statutes 
date back to 1906 and 1917, respectively, and are examples of the Nordic 
legal cooperation which has led to the statutes being adopted not only by 
Denmark, but also by Sweden and Norway.81 The acts are characterized 
by not being as exhaustive as civil codifications tend to be; rather they 
reflect the general principles of contract law, contract formation and 
contractual obligations.82 For example, there is no general statutory 
regulation of contract interpretation, thus leaving this matter to the 
courts.83 Hence, the courts play a particular role in the development of the 
law in areas like the one dealt with in the present article. Though courts 
do rely on previous decisions,84 it is worth noting that Denmark does not 
adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis.85 Instead, judges may simply signal 
what arguments led them to decide in a particular way,86 and this 
combination of little non-exhaustive statutory regulation and the lack of 
official stare decisis has been described as ‘statutory light’ and ‘precedent 
light’.87 
The fact that EA clauses are not subject to particular statutory 
regulation in Denmark makes it important to understand how the Danish 
judiciary approaches determination of contractual content and contract 
interpretation in order to predict the implications of including an EA 
clause in a contract governed by Danish law. Thus far, very few decisions 
from Denmark have been identified as clearly dealing with this issue, 
though as previously explained, EA clauses are increasingly being used by 
Danish corporations in contracts governed by Danish law. Two decisions 
by the Copenhagen Maritime and Commercial Court (Sandrew Metronome 
International v Angel Scandinavia88 and Rotate Aviation v Air Kilroe89), however, 
                                                            
78 O Lando et al., Restatement of Nordic Contract Law 14 (Djøf 2016) (hereinafter 
Restatement of Nordic Contract Law), 14; P Møgelvang-Hansen, ‘The Nordic Tradition: 
Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Danish Law’ in Cordero-Moss ed., Boilerplate 
Clauses (n 1), 233. 
79 Lovbekendtgørelse af 17.2.2014 nr. 140 Købelov (Købeloven). 
80 Lovbekendtgørelse af 2.3.2016 nr. 193 om aftaler og andre retshandler på 
formuerettens område (Aftaleloven). 
81 On Nordic cooperation, see Nielsen (n 31), 38-40.  
82 P Møgelvang-Hansen, ‘Contracts and Sales in Denmark’ in B Dahl et al., Danish Law 
in a European Perspective (2nd edn, Karnov 2002), 238. 
83 Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (n 78), 28. 
84 T Håstad (ed), The Nordic Contracts Act: Essays in Celebration of Its One Hundred Anniversary 
(Djøf 2015), 25-28 (at 28 stating that ‘... the Danish ... Supreme Court has changed over 
the last two decades from being a court of appeals to becoming a court of precedents.’). 
85 Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (n 78), 18. 
86 Lookofsky (n 76), 177-178. 
87 Lookofsky (n 76), 178. 
88 SH2005.H-0132-02. 
89 SH2012.H-0011-11. 
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do consider the implication of an EA clause, though due to the less 
formalistic approach by the Danish judiciary, the background law is not 
possible to decipher. While in the former case the Copenhagen Maritime 
and Commercial Court ignored the EA clause, in the latter the court 
adhered to it entirely; in both cases without further explanation as to the 
applicable background law. Instead, the court relied fully on contract 
interpretation as it saw fit in both decisions. 
Most likely, the court in Sandrew Metronome International v Angel 
Scandinavia did not rely on any particular law. When deciding disputes, 
especially in the area of contract law, Danish judges are often unwilling to 
or not able to rely on strict formal statutes as these are very limited and 
even when such are available, they generally do not feel strictly bound by 
the wording of such statutes.90 Instead, the judges will aim to reach a 
reasonable and fair outcome.91 One scholar has described the ways of the 
Danish judiciary as one where the judge has an idea about the outcome 
and then reasons backwards to test the correctness of his conclusion.92 
This particular style may seem unfamiliar and perhaps even inappropriate 
to lawyers outside the Nordic region, and the Danish courts have indeed 
been criticized for their lack of transparency and predictability when they 
decide without any clear legal basis. One author critically describes the 
courts as giving oracle-like decisions.93 However, dealing with contractual 
disputes through a weighing of values, principles and considerations of the 
particular trade rather than by formal rules is also a pragmatic one, and it 
has proved to be both an effective and respected way of dispute 
resolution.94 
To provide but one example of the style of the Danish judiciary, one 
may again turn to Sandrew Metronome International v Angel Scandinavia.95 The 
decision by the court is reasoned entirely by facts and is rather short – 
approximately 500 words. In no place does the court refer to applicable 
law, rules or principles. This style of the Danish judiciary is common in 
                                                            
90 Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (n 78), 16. 
91 The statutory expression of the principle of reasonableness can be found in Art 36 of 
the Contracts Act. 
92 J Lookofsky, ‘The Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom: Under the UNIDROIT 
“Restatement” and Danish Law’ (1998) 46 AJCL 485, 489-490. 
93 C Torp, ‘I Anledning af Højesterets 250-aarige Bestaaen’ (1911) Ugeskrift for 
Retsvæsen B 49, 54. See also MB Andersen, Grundlæggende aftaleret (4th edn, Gjellerup 
2013), 446. 
94 Håstad (ed) (n 84), 30 (‘For a pragmatist the consequences of a rule may be more important 
than its contents.’). 
95 See also Bonansea v Bombardier Copenhagen Maritime and Commercial Court 1 
December 2008 CISGNORDIC.net ID: 081201DK in which a similar approach is 
followed in clearly international contractual disputes. However, compare MJM Athletic 
Surplus v Con.com Copenhagen Maritime and Commercial Court 26 February 2010 
CISGNORDIC.net ID: 100226DK in which the court’s reasoning was clearly based on 
application of the CISG. 
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decisions both involving domestic as well as international disputes, and it 
makes it difficult to draw general conclusions to be followed in the future. 
Though particularly international disputes may place on the court a duty 
to carefully consider conflict of law rules or rules aiming at achieving 
uniformity in the field, the Danish judiciary has not felt compelled to 
change their style.96 
4.2. THE INSEPARABLE ISSUES OF CONTRACTUAL CONTENT AND 
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
Danish contract law does not distinguish between determining the 
contractual content and contract interpretation as is done in common 
law.97 As described above, in the USA the judge will first establish which 
terms form the contract and then interpret them. At least that is the 
starting point, although often confused in practice and theory.98 In 
Denmark as well as in other civil law countries the two steps merge 
together. Ascertaining the borders of a contract – i.e. which terms are in 
and which are out – is a part of the contract interpretation exercise. Thus, 
as a result of interpretation, a term may be supplemented by other 
documents or even added to the contractual text. 
The parol evidence rule is not known in Denmark. When 
interpreting a contract, including the determination of its borders, a 
Danish judge will consider the intention of the parties at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract.99 Quite naturally, the intention is proven 
primarily by the text of the contract.100 Prior negotiations, statements and 
agreements, whether written or oral, are thus prima facie irrelevant,101 
however, they may be furnished as proof without any restrictions 
according to the principle of freely admissible evidence in section 344 of 
the Administration of Justice Act.102 The presence of an EA clause in a 
contract challenges this free admissibility of extrinsic evidence and is dealt 
with below. 
                                                            
96 J Lookofsky, ‘De danske domstoles håndtering af CISG’ (2012) 2012(27,28,29) 
Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen B 281, 281-289. 
97 P Høghberg, ‘Avtaletolkning’ in MB Andersen et al. (eds), Aftaleloven 100 år: Baggrund, 
status, udfordringer, fremtid (Djøf 2015), 161. 
98 N 79 
99 Møgelvang-Hansen (n 82), 254. 
100 NJ Clausen et al., Dansk Privatret (19th ed., Djøf 2016), 140.  
101 Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 1973.338 H (The Supreme Court decided that witness 
statement on prior negotiation is not admissible as the contract included a clear provision 
on the disputed matter.). 
102 Lovbekendtgørelse af 13.10.2016 nr. 1257 Retsplejeloven § 344. B Gomard, HVG 
Pedersen and A Ørgaard, Almindelig Kontraktsret (5th edn, Djøf 2015), para 3.2.2; JM 
Lookofsky, Consequential Damages in Comparative Context (Djøf 1989), 59 (describes this as 
‘a Scandinavian version of the [parol evidence] rule.’). 
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4.3. PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE JUDICIARY 
The pragmatic approach taken by Danish courts is not to be equated 
with an absolute power by the judge to render the decision he desires, nor 
is it to be understood as a complete vacuum of law in which no guidelines 
exist. Rather, the Danish judiciary adheres to a number of considerations. 
These considerations permeate the Danish legal system in general and in 
particular the field of contract law. To understand how the judiciary may 
receive EA clauses in practice requires insight into those guiding 
principles. Hence, they are elaborated further below as they explain the 
somewhat inconclusive answer to the question raised in this article. 
The interpretation rules contained in the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles 
2010) are similar to those applying in Danish law.103 In relation to the topic 
of this article, it is worth noting that Danish interpretation rules include 
interpretation in accordance with the common intention of the parties,104 
interpretation of communication in line with a party’s intentions when the 
other party could not be unaware of it,105 and that all circumstances may 
be relied upon to demonstrate the party’s/parties’ intentions.106  
The principle according to which any circumstance may be relied 
upon also links to the general rules on legal procedures that any evidence 
is permissible and can be weighed by the judge without any formal 
restrictions.107 This principle goes before the parties’ agreement regarding 
evidence,108 and upholding clauses restricting this principle would be to 
uphold agreements not anchored in the will of the parties since the parties 
are precluded from proving the contents of the agreement that was in fact 
made.109 However, there are authors calling for caution in setting aside an 
EA clause since the commercial parties’ contractual freedom combined 
with the principle of pacta sunt servanda should prevail over the procedural 
rules in relation to evidence.110 Though this may be true, Danish law relies 
heavily on considerations often tied to non-contractual circumstances. 
Due to the principle of freedom of form and since evidence can be freely 
admitted, agreements are interpreted as a whole, meaning that the parties 
may refer to the purpose of the agreement, gap-filling rules, written and 
oral communication, previous and subsequent conduct, usual conduct in 
                                                            
103 Andersen (n 93), 312. 
104 UNIDROIT Principles 2010 Art 4.1; Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (n 78), 
para 5-1. 
105 UNIDROIT Principles 2010 Art 4.2; Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (n 78), 
para 5-2. 
106 UNIDROIT Principles 2010 Art 4.3; Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (n 78), 
para 5-5. 
107 Lovbekendtgørelse af 13.10.2016 nr. 1257, Retsplejeloven, para 344. 
108 Andersen (n 93), 328. 
109 Andersen (n 93), 328. 
110 Gorton (n 12), 8. 
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the trade, etc.,111 as expressed in section 5-5 of the Restatement of Nordic 
Contract Law: 
‘In interpreting a contract […] due consideration must be given to all the relevant 
circumstances of the relationship, and in particular to: (a) the wording of the contract; 
(b) the nature and purpose of the contract; (c) the circumstances in which the contract 
was concluded, including the preliminary negotiations; (d) the conduct of the parties, 
including conduct subsequent to the conclusion of the contract; (e) the interpretation which 
the parties have previously given to similar clauses and the practices established between 
the parties; (f) rules of law, usage and the meanings commonly given to terms and 
expressions in the branch of activity concerned; (g) reasonableness and loyalty; and (h) 
the principles in § 5-6 to § 5-10.’112 
When engaged in contract interpretation, Danish law and the Danish 
judiciary do not distinguish clearly between contract interpretation and 
gap-filling. Rather, the two are seen as parts of an integrated process 
utilizing various methods and rules; hence it is crucial to know that the 
judiciary relies on a number of considerations that permeate the 
interpretation process.113 Several considerations may be taken into 
account, and the most salient ones are described below. It is important to 
stress that these principles do not form part of a hierarchical structure. 
Instead, they must be balanced.114 The considerations that may be relied 
upon contradict each other and form an enigma of equally plausible 
reasons for a particular court decision. The enigma consists of at least 
three primary considerations and a number of variations of them. 
The first one is the consideration of the promisor’s intentions 
according to which the judiciary is occupied by reaching an interpretation 
of the contract that does not impose an obligation on the promisor that it 
would usually not assume.115 This entails two things. First, the subjective 
will of the promisor is relied upon to determine the agreement between 
the parties when the promisee could not be unaware of that intention.116 
The reasonable person standard plays a role when determining what the 
promisee should have been aware of.117 Second, the parties’ implied 
expectations may be decisive in determining the content of the agreement 
between them and where those implied expectations do not hold true, it 
may be a reason for modifying or setting aside the agreement in part or in 
total according to paragraph 36 of the Danish Contracts Act.118 In relation 
to EA clauses, it is relevant to know that the parties’ presumptions, that 
may not necessarily be expressed in the wording of the contract, may be 
                                                            
111 Andersen (n 93), 310-311. 
112 Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (n 78), para 5-5. 
113 Andersen (n 93), 312. 
114 MB Andersen and E Runesson, ‘An Overview of Nordic Contract Law’ in Andersen 
et al. (n 97), 39. 
115 Andersen et al. (n 97), 39. 
116 Andersen (n 93), 448. 
117 Andersen (n 93), 448. See also Restatement of Nordic Contract Law (n 78), para 5-4. 
118 Andersen (n 93), 448-449. 
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relied upon by the court to interpret the parties’ agreement or to render 
parts of it invalid.119 
The second consideration is whether to protect the promisee’s 
reliance in the promisor and to uphold the understanding the promisee 
had of the promise made by the promisor.120 This entails securing a 
predictable supply chain by not allowing deviations from the promisee’s 
reasonable understanding of the promise made, by upholding the contract, 
and by protecting justified expectations that are based on or verified by 
for example conduct of the party/parties, practice between them, or usage 
in the trade.121 Thus, it may be that a court would be reluctant to blindly 
apply an EA clause if it means to exclude considerations protecting the 
promisee’s reliance when it appears only from non-contractual 
circumstances. 
The third consideration is of public interest, such as eliminating 
unreasonable contract practice, protecting certain parties, or creating 
incentives for a certain behaviour.122 Often, such considerations include 
thoughts on distribution of risk, protecting weak parties, promoting loyal 
behaviour, and discouraging abuse of legal or contractual rights.123 
When two or more guiding principles are relevant for the dispute at 
hand, but they contradict each other, a weighing is necessary. This 
weighing is not governed by any rules. Instead, the judiciary will consider 
whether giving preference to one or the other consideration leads to a 
desired distribution of risk between the parties, and whether the result 
appears to be proportional.124  
Therefore, knowing that non-contractual circumstances form an 
integrated part of establishing both the content of the parties’ agreement 
as well as interpreting it, makes it difficult to support that EA clauses will 
have an effect resembling the one known in US law when the contract is 
governed by Danish law and decided upon by a Danish judiciary. It may 
simply be asking too much of the judiciary, and despite the lack of 
transparent reasoning in Danish court decisions, this article shall attempt 
to address the possible implications of EA clauses in a Danish context 
immediately below. 
4.4. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF EA CLAUSES GOVERNED BY DANISH 
LAW 
Considering the many guiding principles, the unwillingness of 
Danish courts to adhere to strict formalistic rules, the sparse reasoning in 
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decisions, and the low amount of decisions on EA clauses make it difficult 
to predict the effect of EA clauses governed by Danish law. 
On one hand, Sandrew Metronome International v Angel Scandinavia 
shows that the judiciary is willing to consider extrinsic evidence no matter 
the unequivocal inclusion of an EA clause in the contract. In the particular 
dispute, ANGEL SCANDINAVIA had sublicensed the right to distribute 
a movie to movie theatres in Sweden, Norway and Finland, as well as the 
right to distribute the movie outside theatres in Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway and Finland to METRONOME INT’L. The latter were to pay 
for the sublicense by paying royalties, though a minimum payment of 
DKK 6 million was agreed upon. ANGEL SCANDINAVIA reserved the 
right to distribute the movie to theatres in Denmark. The dispute 
concerned whether the guarantee of a minimum royalty payment provided 
by METRONOME INT’L for the distribution of the movie should be 
reduced by the income ANGEL SCANDINAVIA had from distributing 
the same movie to theatres in Denmark. The dispute involved both the 
sublicense agreement and a number of standard documents. To shed light 
on the understanding of the royalty calculations, reference to the 
negotiations was made. 
The decision rendered by the Copenhagen Maritime and 
Commercial Court illustrates not only the dissociation from the applicable 
background law by the court in its reasoning, but also that the 
circumstances of the dispute are weighed in light of the considerations 
described previously. The parties neither disputed that the EA clause 
formed a part of the agreement, nor did any of them argue that it was 
invalid. One party argued that the EA clause was irrelevant since there was 
no contradiction between the prior negotiations, the correspondence 
between the parties, and the final contract. The other party argued that the 
EA clause prohibited any extrinsic evidence. The court stated in its 
extremely brief reasoning that the understanding of the disputed crossing 
clause were to be based on an ‘overall assessment of the parties’ agreement, 
including the Schedule of Definitions, the General Terms and Conditions, the Standard 
Terms, the Delivery Schedule, and the prior negotiations.’125 Hence, it seems like 
the EA clause was ignored by the court as it was willing to conduct an 
overall assessment of the contract and prior negotiations regardless of 
whether those were contradictory or not. On this background, it is 
questionable whether the inclusion of an EA clause in a contract will have 
any effect resembling what is expected under US law. Instead, it seems 
that EA clauses in a Danish context place the judiciary in a quandary; first, 
by asking it to distinguish between contract determination and contract 
interpretation, and second, by asking it to adhere to strict rules of formality 
contrary to the pragmatic principle-guided approach normally applied. In 
the case of Sandrew Metronome International v Angel Scandinavia there is no 
                                                            
125 Sandrew Metronome International v Angel Scandinavia, p. 20. Translation of the original text 
by Thomas Neumann. 
NJCL 2017/2 
 
203 
evidence that the court considered the parties’ intention of including the 
EA clause, thus setting aside both the principle according to which the 
understanding that will give terms of the contract effect is preferred126 and 
the party autonomy. 
On the other hand, one of the considerations is in fact the protection 
of the parties’ will. In Rotate Aviation v Air Kilroe the court decided to 
uphold an EA clause agreed upon. More specifically, the court had to 
decide whether or not the meaning expressed in a letter of intent could be 
used to shed light on an understanding of the final sales contract. The 
dispute concerned whether ROTATE AVIATION was entitled to 
payment for acting as an agent regarding the sale of three aeroplanes from 
AIR KILROE to BLUE AIR. ROTATE AVIATION’s efforts had 
resulted in BLUE AIR signing a letter of intent to purchase and to deposit 
a refundable sum and later non-refundable sums depending on the 
approval of the aeroplanes at a pre-inspection. Later, BLUE AIR decided 
to not take delivery of the aeroplanes and demanded the deposits to be 
returned with reference to the letter of intent. With reference to the agency 
agreement, ROTATE AVIATION demanded half of the non-refundable 
sums as payment for its efforts. As a part of sorting out the contractual 
relationship between AIR KILROE as the seller and BLUE AIR as the 
buyer, the court stated expressly that according to the EA clause contained 
in the sales contract ‘[…] the letter of intent cannot be given consideration.’127 The 
court gave preference to the unequivocal and undisputed EA clause, thus 
following the supremacy of party autonomy and in turn also decided that 
ROTATE AVIATION as an agent could not rely on the initial letter of 
intent. The decision excluded terms of returning deposits from the letter 
of intent and gave preference only to the refund clauses contained in the 
final agreement. Thus, ROTATE AVIATION’s share of the non-
refundable deposits were calculated based on the main agreement leaving 
aside the letter of intent due to the EA clause included in the final 
agreement, but not in the letter of intent. 
One way of reconciling these otherwise divergent decisions is 
looking towards the background of the parties in dispute. The Danish 
judiciary will often do this as a part of a three-step approach to contract 
clauses in dispute: is the clause agreed upon(?), how is the clause to be 
interpreted(?), and is the clause so unreasonable that it should be set aside 
or changed(?).128 In neither of the two cases addressed previously was it 
disputed that the EA clause had been agreed upon, leaving it to the court 
to decide on the interpretation and effect of the clause, but in doing so, 
the court moved beyond the four corners of the contract. 
In Sandrew Metronome International v Angel Scandinavia both parties were 
from Scandinavian countries. The former most likely from Sweden and 
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the latter from Denmark. This means that the dispute essentially was 
between parties from the same Nordic legal tradition. A tradition that 
normally does not adhere to strict requirements in respect to contract 
form as explained earlier. In contrast, the parties in Rotate Aviation v Air 
Kilroe were from Denmark and the UK respectively, meaning that the 
dispute was a civil law/common law one. The parties could rightfully be 
thought to have different expectations as to the effect of an EA clause. 
The court could have considered this aspect in its decision, but due to the 
unfortunate tradition of oracle-like decisions, it is not possible to decipher 
this from the decisions themselves. A qualified guess is that the judiciary 
has followed the familiar three-step approach to tease out the proper 
application of the EA clause, thus ignoring the American effects and 
intentions behind such EA clauses and instead given priority to the likely 
expectations of the parties in the specific disputes. 
4.5. FINAL REMARKS ON THE TREATMENT OF EA CLAUSES UNDER 
DANISH LAW 
There seems to be a common understanding in the Nordic 
scholarship that an EA clause can limit, but not eliminate the free 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence; an EA clause is considered to raise the 
burden of proof, i.e. particularly strong evidence is necessary to prove that 
the intention of the parties differs from what is expressed in the 
contractual text.129 This conclusion seems to be grounded in the 
underlying values and principles of Danish (contract) law. The courts are 
presumed to weigh the freedom of contract against their own rules for 
free admissibility and assessment of evidence. As none of those principles 
are apparently stronger, the scholarship presumes that judges would likely 
give a limited effect to both. 
The discussion on the two available Danish cases indicates, however, 
that Danish adjudicators might instead of taking the middle road turn fully 
one or the other way. As suggested above, the origin of the contractual 
parties might be the determining factor for establishing EA clauses’ effect. 
If both parties come from Denmark (or Nordic countries for that matter), 
it might be too outstretched, in the face of the principle of free admission 
and assessment of evidence, to assign to the clause its original aim. 
However, if one of the parties comes from a common law country, and if 
the contract, although governed by Danish law, is clearly based on a 
common law model (and especially if there is other connection to a 
common law country), subjecting the EA clause to Danish interpretation 
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rules might result in a situation where the clause does not make legal sense 
and the parties’ intention is not respected.130 
From the discussion so far, it becomes obvious that the scant 
reference to EA clauses in Danish case law can give us only hints of 
Danish courts’ treatment of these US-originated provisions. What we can 
deduce is that when establishing the content of and interpreting 
commercial contracts in the light of an EA clause, Danish courts tend to 
give more importance to the underlying values and principles of 
reasonableness and fairness rather than going into technical details of the 
governing law’s rules. This can be (even unconsciously) led by the 
objective of not compromising the Danish contract interpretation rules. 
Thus, the overall conclusion is that EA clauses do not keep their original 
function when inserted in contracts governed by Danish law, as their 
outcomes are at least uncertain. Does that mean that the effects of EA 
clauses in contracts concluded in the US jurisdiction and the Danish 
jurisdiction are fundamentally different? 
5. DISCUSSION – LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, CONVERGENCE, 
TRANSNATIONALIZATION OR? 
Part 3 and 4 above discussed the treatment of EA clauses in US and 
Danish law respectively. Originating in common law jurisdiction, EA 
clauses are foreign to civil law systems, and thus also to the Danish one. 
Yet, they are regularly used in contracts drafted by Danish companies and 
governed by Danish law. Is this practice an expression of a legal 
transplanting process, convergence between the two systems or neither of 
these, but rather a proof of transnationalization of commercial contract 
law? 
The use of EA clauses by Danish companies can indeed be 
considered a legal transplant or more broadly an example of diffusion of 
law; a non-morally loaded rule originating from a foreign jurisdiction is 
through the means of commercial contracts applied in a new setting.131 
The question that should be answered is whether EA clauses maintain 
their original purpose in the Danish context. 
                                                            
130 For discussion on this issue, see G Cordero-Moss and C Wallgren-Lindholm in 
Andersen and Christoffersen (n 33); L Gorton, ‘Syndicated Loans – Some Thoughts on 
the Reception of Anglo-American Contract Practice into Swedish Law’ (2007) 18(2) 
E.B.L.R. 313, 334. 
131 In line with the transferists, led by Watson, such transfer of rules may successfully 
happen regardless of the cultural and political differences between the two jurisdictions. 
Though, transferists have been criticized for disregarding such differences, Watson 
himself clarifies that the rule in the new setting will be affected and not work exactly the 
same as in the original jurisdiction, see Watson (n 10), 82. We do not take a position 
within this article in regard to the tranferists v culturalists debate; instead we take what is 
common for the legal transfer theory as our point of departure. 
EA CLAUSES: US AND DANISH LAW? 206 
The original purpose of EA clauses was to exclude any extrinsic 
evidence for the purpose of construing a contract; EA clauses were not to 
have any effect on contract interpretation. However, nowadays, as we have 
described in section IV, this original purpose is not always achieved even 
in the US jurisdiction and has developed in two directions. On the one 
hand, the effects of an EA clause, once taken as the ultimate proof that 
contractual parties intended to conclude a fully integrated agreement, have 
eroded.132 It is now more often taken as only one and rebuttable evidence 
in this respect. On the other hand, when given effect in the question of 
determining the contractual content, EA clauses are sometimes also given 
effect in respect of interpretation. 
Nor in a Danish context do EA clauses fulfil the original purpose as 
their interpretation by adjudicators is uncertain in the sense that Danish 
principles of contract law and rules on evidence will in general not be 
overruled by the text of a commercial contract. Therefore, it may very well 
be that an adjudicator decides to give a full effect to an EA clause as seen 
in Rotate Aviation v Air Kilroe, but that is most probably a result of 
application of the principles of reasonableness and the pragmatic 
approach. However, it should here be stated again that this is only a 
qualified guess of the authors, as the brief reasoning in the case does not 
reveal the arguments that led the judge to decide in this way. This 
conclusion is nevertheless supported by the fact that the same court 
decided in the exact opposite direction in Sandrew Metronome International v 
Angel Scandinavia. 
In light of the above, the results in individual cases in the USA and 
Denmark may not be as different as we could reasonably expect, taking 
the varying rules on contract interpretation into account.133 However, the 
differences in the legal cultures and the divergent reasons why EA clauses 
are not consistently interpreted in either of the jurisdictions persist; EA 
clauses are treated differently in the two jurisdictions despite the similar 
outcomes. 134 This makes it impossible to assess whether we can speak of 
a successful legal transplant. In this situation, it is thus necessary to move 
beyond the legal transplants theory to explain this phenomenon and its 
legal implications. The theory of legal convergence, and namely the natural 
legal convergence, comes into discussion here.135 As the business 
community becomes increasingly transnational, the behaviour of 
companies is increasingly aligned. This is the result of the effectiveness of 
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the business world and its ‘yearning for simplicity’.136 The presence of 
differences between national legal systems gives rise to legal uncertainty 
of commercial subjects and thus may hamper international transactions.137 
Elimination of the differences is desirable, though not easy to attain.138 
Unifying contractual content through its reuse by companies is one way 
to achieve such a convergence. The bottom-up (natural) convergence is 
considered by Merryman as ‘the most effective mode of convergence of laws, superior 
to legal transplantation and to active unification in the depth and permanence of its 
consequences.’139 The fact that contractual parties adjust their behaviour to 
the clauses might then be seen as a proof that the law develops 
independently from scholarship, courts and legislation.140 However, in the 
authors’ opinion, it is too soon to speak about convergence of common 
and civil contract law or about existence of transnational contract law. As 
there is neither consistency in the application of EA clauses in various 
jurisdictions nor a single adjudication body to decide on international 
contract law disputes, the national contract law systems and national 
courts will remain the determining factor for assigning EA clauses any 
legal effects. For now, the available court decisions from the jurisdictions 
do not show mutual appreciation between the two legal systems, although 
the results are not as divergent as expected. Overall, what we are 
experiencing seems to be convergence or transnationalization of 
contractual practice rather than contract law. Moreover, looking at the 
overwhelming prevalence of American contract models, we can even 
speak of Americanization of contractual practice, meaning an active 
reception of an American contract drafting style rather than natural 
convergence.141 
6. CONCLUSION 
This article examined the diffusion process of EA clauses from the 
US to Danish jurisdiction. Through conducted interviews and study of 
available literature, it was established that Danish companies use EA 
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clauses regularly in international contracts. However, based on a 
scholarship review and discussion of two Danish cases, we find that EA 
clauses do not always keep their original effects in contracts governed by 
Danish law, similarly as they do not in contracts governed by American 
law. From Danish case law it is obvious that Danish courts are not ready 
to give up their wide discretion and their decision practice based on 
reasonableness and pragmatism reflected in short reasoning and ‘oracle-
like’ decisions. 
From the conducted analysis that identified the pertaining differing 
approaches of the judiciaries in the two countries in regard to EA clauses, 
we can conclude that while we cannot truly speak of convergence between 
the US and Danish contract law systems, we can speak of convergence, 
and specifically Americanization of the Danish contracting practice in this 
respect. This does not seem to be the case for Denmark only, but appears 
to be a common observation in other civil law jurisdictions as well.142 In 
regard to transnationalization of commercial contract law, we might thus 
conclude that the contract drafting process overtakes the judiciary that is 
more attached to national rules and values. In line with the irritant 
perspective on the legal transplants theory presented by Teubner, it can 
then be expected that the contract drafting practice will in turn influence 
national legal rules and the courts’ approach.143 This effect can already be 
seen in Danish legal scholarship and its presumption that the judges will 
not entirely disregard EA clauses, but take a middle road in interpreting 
them. However, the presumption that contracting practice influences the 
legal rules and judiciary approach would imply that there is a clear and 
unified purpose behind inclusion of EA clauses into contracts by Danish 
companies, which the legislative and judiciary powers will aim to protect. 
Whether such common purpose in reality exists, is however a topic for 
another article. 
Based on the present research, an advice to Danish as well as 
arguably companies from other civil law jurisdictions using EA clauses is 
for them to adapt the clauses to the intended purpose rather than to the 
governing law. This means to specify in the clause whether it is intended 
to have a substantive (establishing the contractual content) or 
interpretation related (gap-filling, clarifying ambiguities) effect; and which 
documents, norms and conduct are to be excluded as evidence for 
establishing and/or interpreting the contract. Doing so may not secure 
that the adjudicators would feel obliged to follow such a clause, but would 
make it much more difficult for them to argue against it.  
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